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The present collection of essays entitled Foundations of 
Clinical Reasoning: An Epistemological Stance aims at 
shedding light on the epistemological approaches to the 
foundations of reasoning in clinical research and practice, 
and other related topics. Specifically, this issue of Topoi is 
intended to promote a new epistemological reflection on 
some foundational issues of clinical reasoning in research 
and practice. We focused on: (i) methodological validity 
and limitations of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) 
and Evidence Based Medicine (EBM), (ii) varieties of clini-
cal reasoning and values, and (iii) the Bayesian approach in 
clinical research and practice. While the collection by no 
means aims at covering all the main topics that have been 
discussed in the contemporary debate on the foundations of 
clinical reasoning, we hope nevertheless to introduce the 
reader to some of the most interesting and recently more 
discussed topics in the field.
1  Validity and Limitations of RCTs
Over the last few decades of twentieth century, the complex-
ity and the rigor of medical methods have increased expo-
nentially. Over the years, medical doctors have faced the 
typical issues of philosophy of science, such as the relation 
between theories and experiments, the causal inference or 
the nature of explanation. This has unfolded an interdiscipli-
nary dialogue between philosophers and physicians. Among 
the most discussed epistemological issues, the problem of 
the external validity might be considered as one of the most 
urgent as regards the clinical reasoning. This problem arises 
from the fact that the results of the Randomized Controlled 
Trials (RCTs) are not always applied to the whole reference 
population, which is identified with people needing a medi-
cal treatment. Following Campbell and Stanley (1966), the 
expression external validity “asks the question of generaliz-
ability: To what populations, settings, treatment variables 
and measurement variables can this effect be generalized?”. 
However, the term ‘generalization’ referring to controlled 
clinical experiments might not be sufficiently precise to 
grasp the problem, because it is not only a matter of justify-
ing an inference from an experiment conducted on a nar-
row number of patients, but also justifying the inference 
towards a single patient (i.e. particularization) (Rothwell 
2005). Once verified that the result of an RCT is valid, we 
still have to explain how to apply this result to patients who 
did not take part in the experiment. As a matter of fact, 
several individuals who present features are excluded from 
the groups of patients selected for the experiment. This is 
because of different reasons, mostly ethical: patients who 
suffer from serious illnesses other than those targeted in the 
treatment (i.e. diabetes), the terminally ills and the elderlies 
(for whom the administration of an experimental treatment 
is considered too risky) are excluded. Things get even worse 
for when investigating of rare or chronic diseases. In the first 
case, it is very difficult to find a sufficient number of patients 
to enroll, in the second case, since the experiments only last 
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for a short time, RCTs cannot provide enough information 
about the effects of an extended treatment. Therefore, how 
can we justify the belief that a certain treatment has the same 
effect when applied to a different setting? Without a reason-
able answer to this latter question, in theory RCTs would 
prove useless, as they would only show the results related to 
a situation, without any guarantee that the same results could 
apply to other contexts.
It is not just a philosophical matter, or a contemporary 
version of Hume’s problem of induction, as the philosopher 
of science Worrall (2009) pointed out. In the case of RCTs 
we know that the context in which the treatment is applied 
will differ from that of the experiment. Then we should clar-
ify the epistemic relevance of “context”, taking in account 
which background conditions defining the context are rel-
evant for the generalization of results (Cartwright 2011). In 
conclusion, an analysis of epistemological issues underlying 
the clinical experimentation (such as the external validity) 
looks fundamental to better understand the process of clini-
cal reasoning.
2  Varieties of Clinical Reasoning and Values
In order to choose a suitable treatment for a patient, diagnos-
tic and prognostic judgements are essential. An epistemolog-
ical analysis of these classical themes of clinical reasoning is 
given by considering the recent logical and epistemological 
discussions on the role of hypothetical reasoning and on the 
connection between population-based knowledge and spe-
cific clinical cases.
2.1  Diagnosis and Clinical Reasoning
Diagnoses almost always occur under a veil of uncertainty, 
so that those who make diagnoses must develop advanced 
probabilistic reasoning skills, being a well-known fact that 
intuitive probabilistic arguments are very likely to be biased 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Moreover, diagnoses are 
frequently based on diagnostic tests, which require statisti-
cal (and clinical) decision making. Assuming that the null 
hypothesis H0 (the no-effect hypothesis to be tested) can 
be rejected, we can accept (in a binary context) an alterna-
tive hypothesis H1, when the p-value (i.e., the probability of 
obtaining a result equal or more extreme than the observed 
one assuming H0 is true) is equal to or less than a specific 
value of statistical significance α (generally identified with a 
probability of 0.01 or 0.05). A type I error occurs when H0 is 
rejected although it is true. A type II error occurs when fail-
ing to reject H0 that it is actually false. The probability of a 
type II error is denoted by β. In the diagnostic framework, if 
H0 is the absence of disease and H1 the presence of disease, 
then type I error is a false positive diagnosis, while the type 
II error is a false negative diagnosis. Notice that it is impor-
tant for an accurate clinical judgement to balance the thresh-
olds for type I (false-positive) and type II (false-negative) 
statistical errors, i.e. the two main ingredients of what it has 
been called “inductive risk” (Hempel 1965; Parascandola 
2010). A proper equilibrium should be achieved between 
statistical errors by also taking into account the sample and 
the effect sizes that one wants to detect, e.g., specific values 
for accepting or rejecting hypotheses (Cranor 1990). Proba-
bilistic reasoning is often involved in diagnostic judgment. 
Also in virtue of this fact, a diagnosis is not normatively 
neutral, since it encompasses both value judgments (also 
with a non-epistemic nature) and critical assessment of evi-
dence and of different types of probability. It is, in fact, usu-
ally assumed that a gap exists between the population-based 
evidence and the specificities of a particular clinical context. 
This poses the problem of interpreting different forms of 
probability and understanding which model of knowledge 
translation could take (quantitative) population-based evi-
dence into account, and still be suitable for contingent clini-
cal situations. In addition, a diagnosis may be incomplete 
in many ways–for instance, if the evidence is insufficient 
or problematic, if the evaluation is not correct according to 
some decision rules, etc.
Although many different types of clinical diagnosis can 
be established, diagnoses can be classified in two broad 
categories: nosographic and pathophysiological (Feder-
spil 2004). Nosographic diagnoses aim to assign a patient’s 
pathological condition to a specific category with a noso-
graphic taxonomy, taking into account only population-
based information. Recognizing the causes, explanations 
and mechanisms behind the individual’s pathological state 
is not tantamount to formulating a nosographic diagnosis. 
However, pathophysiological diagnoses focus specifically on 
the past to shed light on how a patient’s disease developed 
in a specific individual.
2.2  Prognosis and Clinical Reasoning
Prognostication is an action that has been somewhat left 
on the sidelines of current medical practice and it is some-
times erroneously conflated with the diagnostic process 
(Rich 2002). A prognosis is the end-result of a fundamental 
clinical assessment that focuses mainly on the future, and 
that is why it is considered more difficult than establish-
ing diagnoses or making treatment decisions (Christakis 
and Sachs 1996). Even when a diagnosis has been soundly 
formulated, the prognosis may be uncertain because our 
understanding of pathological conditions is always incom-
plete, and diseases may develop in unpredictable ways. The 
aim of prognostics is to judge: (i) the duration of a specific 
future stage of a disease in a given patient (prognosi quoad 
tempus); or (ii) the probability of a patient recovering from 
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a disease (prognosi quoad veletudinem); or (iii) the chances 
of a patient’s survival (prognosi quoad vitam) (Rizzi 1993). 
All these types of prognosis are made with a margin of 
uncertainty, and a prognosis is usually formulated as the 
likelihood of an outcome and/or of a patient’s health taking 
a certain course (in terms of a particular disease) within a 
specified time interval (Djulbegovic et al. 2011). The matter 
is of the utmost importance to patients, and to physicians 
having to make appropriate, tailored treatment decisions.
Like diagnoses, prognoses may be classified within two 
main categories: nosographic and pathophysiological (Fed-
erspil 2004). A nosographic prognosis is based on a noso-
graphic diagnosis and aims to predict when a given patient 
will reach a certain future stage of their disease. This predic-
tion is based on statistical frequencies taken from popula-
tion-based data. A pathophysiological prognosis is based on 
a pathophysiological diagnosis. The prediction of a future 
stage of disease in a given patient is grounded on. Moreover, 
there is an interplay between different types of probability 
(population-based frequencies or probability eliciting clini-
cian knowledge), that may be connected, for instance, in a 
Bayesian framework (see the next Section).
However, it may be the case (in some difficult circum-
stances) that prognostic judgements face ‘fundamental 
uncertainty’ (also called as ‘Keynesian uncertainty’ (Keynes 
2008)), since probability measures may be hardly assign to 
specific future events (Chiffi and Zanotti 2017). This is due 
to the fact that relevant prognostic information cannot be 
available when formulating a prognosis and some future 
scenarios associated with a patient’s disease course might 
be previously inconceivable from a cognitive and methodo-
logical perspective. Despite this remarkable fact, prognostics 
is still classically based on the concept of probabilistic risk, 
without recognizing that it is almost often connected with 
events showing fundamental uncertainty. Some argumenta-
tive and abductive strategies have been explored in some 
of the papers of the present issue in order to make sense 
of those clinical judgements that may face fundamental 
uncertainty.
2.3  Bayesianism in Clinical Research and Practice
Statistical thinking has a central role in raising the scientific 
standards of clinical research and clinical trial has been a 
major field of innovation of statistical methodology.
Traditional frequentist statistics has been the dominant, 
and often exclusive, approach. The classical approach, as 
exemplified by Fisher’s p-values, Neyman–Pearson hypoth-
esis tests, and Neyman’s confidence intervals, is a proce-
dure for concluding the inference about the population 
parameters.
In contrast, the Bayesian approach is based on the learn-
ing from the experimental data and it is generally view as an 
inductive inferential approach of learning about the general 
from particulars (Savage 1954; Bernardo and Smith 1994). 
Rather than employing tests and attempting falsification, the 
available evidence is summarized by a posterior distribu-
tion, and the central goal of Bayesian inference is computing 
the posterior probabilities of hypotheses avoiding the null 
hypothesis paradigm and the logic of p-values.
Three points are important in Bayesian approach: (i) the 
prior distribution used to summarize the information known 
a priori; (ii) the likelihood to generate the posterior and (iii) 
distribution of the posterior. The relation between posterior, 
prior and likelihood is given by posterior proportional to 
likelihood × prior, according to the Bayes’s rule.
Suppose the aim of a study is to determine the treatment 
effect to reduce the tumor growth in oncological patients. 
The distribution about the effectiveness of both the experi-
mental and the treatment are required. This kind of informa-
tion is considered as prior information and can be available 
from preliminary data or earlier studies.
The priors can be distinguished into informative or non-
informative. The non-informative prior gives equal chances 
of all possible values to occur in the experiment. The 
informative prior is selective to be included in the sample 
and there are different types of priors, which can be used to 
carry out the analysis: conjugate prior distribution (family 
of distribution that yield to the get the posterior distribution 
which is still of the same family of the prior distribution); 
locally uniform prior (prior that changes over the region in 
which the likelihood is appreciable, and does not assume 
large values outside that range); location-invariant prior and 
scale-invariant prior (prior that is invariant to the scale of 
measurement).
The second point consists in formulating the experimental 
data as likelihood of the experimental treatment over the 
standard one. In this step the prior information is multiplied 
by the likelihood and the result is a distribution that can be 
used to get directly any information about the experimental 
treatment (the result observed through non-informative prior 
is image of the data alone).
In contrast, the reasoning behind the classical approach is 
not similarly straightforward. For example, when performing 
a statistical test, the aim is to know whether the observed 
difference can be explained by simple chance variation. If 
the test is statistically significant, the probability of getting a 
result equal or more extreme to the one obtained in the study 
(the classical p-value) under the null hypothesis of absence 
of any difference (i.e. by chance) is lower than the threshold 
of statistical significance. This probability is considered suf-
ficiently small to conclude that the observed difference does 
not arise from chance. However, the p-values do not directly 
express the probability of the truth of the null hypothesis, i.e. 
that the observed difference can be explained by chance vari-
ation. Being a probability conditional on the null hypothesis, 
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they are a measure of the fit of the null hypothesis to the 
data, which is not always relevant to the aim of the research 
(Greenland et al. 2016). The same considerations apply 
to any equivalent procedure, like summarizing results by 
whether the confidence interval includes the value of the 
null hypothesis.
The conceptual model of the repeated sampling behind 
the traditional approach entails the issue of statistical mul-
tiplicity. While performing many statistical tests (i.e. when 
more than endpoint is going to be analyzed) the probability 
of making at least one type I error increases with the num-
ber of tests performed. These issues are not encountered in 
a Bayesian framework of data analysis since it works in the 
context of the data gathered from the actual experiment and 
not in the perspective of an infinite repetition of the same 
experiment. Despite these pitfalls of the traditional approach 
in addressing directly the research questions, the Bayesian 
approach is less common in clinical research since it does 
not easily lend itself to an oversimplified decision-making 
system, being less suited to a final judgment of true/false 
type. Regulatory agencies, especially for phase III pivotal 
trials, necessarily need to draw true/false conclusions about 
the superiority of an experimental therapy.
A side effect of the frequentist rigour and narrowness of 
focus to the experiment at hand is the inflexibility, which 
can limit innovation especially in the design and analysis 
of clinical trials. Therefore, clinical trials tend to be overly 
large, increasing the cost of developing new therapy and 
unnecessarily exposing some patients to inferior experimen-
tal treatments.
The Bayesian updating process has profound implica-
tions for trial design. Perhaps its most useful consequence 
is the ability to quantify (probabilistically) what is going 
to happen in a trial from any point on, given the currently 
available evidence. More generally, the posterior probabil-
ity can be used as predictive probability, i.e. the posterior 
distribution becomes the new prior distribution to use along 
with the likelihood to assess the prediction of hypothetical 
new results, without the need to implement complex group 
sequential boundaries to the type I error rate inflation arising 
from testing repeatedly interim data (DeMets and Lan 1994).
The Bayesian process of continuous learning makes it 
possible to modify a trial in midcourse. This kind of modi-
fications include stopping the trial, adaptively assigning 
patients to treatment that are performing better, adding and 
dropping treatment arms, and extending accrual.
Finally, in analyzing data, the Bayesian aptitude is to 
bring all the available information, which is typically over-
looked because traditional approach struggles to dealing 
with it. For example, when survival is the primary endpoint, 
patient-specific outcomes that might be correlated with sur-
vival are usually not considered in the classical approach, 
whereas they can be easily considered in the hierarchical 
modeling strategy allowed by the Bayesian framework 
(Bhattacharjee 2013).
3  The Papers of this Issue
The papers of our special issue are grouped in the aforemen-
tioned three sections:
3.1  I. Validity and Limitations of RCTs and EBM
(1) Lalumera & Fanti raise the problem of applicability of 
RCTs to validate nuclear diagnostic imaging tests. In 
spite of the wide application of PET and other similar 
techniques that use radiopharmaceuticals for diagnostic 
purposes, RCT evidence is sparse. The authors argue 
that this occurs due to the specific characteristics, that 
they extensively discuss, of nuclear diagnostic imag-
ing and of radiopharmaceuticals. The paper is meant to 
contribute both to the philosophical discussion on the 
EBM hierarchy of evidence, and on the specific debate 
on radiopharmaceuticals in nuclear medicine.
(2) Hovda points out that EBM may be a controversial 
model when it comes to research into the effectiveness 
of psychotherapeutic treatments. This is partially due 
to the so-called ‘Dodo Bird verdict’, a thesis claiming 
that that all psychotherapies are equally effective, and 
that their effectiveness is largely due to the placebo 
effect. In response to this controversy, Hovda argues 
that EBM can nevertheless be made to fit research into 
the effectiveness of psychotherapy, once a piecemeal 
approach to conducting RCTs is considered. Such an 
approach requires studying the contributions made by 
the individual components of a treatment.
(3) Osimani and colleagues focus on the so-called In-Silico 
Clinical Trials (ISCTs), undertaking a formal analysis 
of them, as opposed to RCTs, in order to identify their 
distinct contribution to causal inference in the clinical 
setting. The authors claim that ISCTs can improve the 
extrapolation of RCTs results, and therefore in assess-
ing their external validity. Furthermore, ISCTs can 
be said to encode “thick” causal knowledge (knowl-
edge about the biological mechanisms underpinning 
the causal effects at the clinical level)—as opposed to 
“thin” difference-making information inferred from 
RCTs. With regard to causality, Osimani and her co-
authors conclude that ISCTs and RCTs cannot replace 
one another, but rather they are complementary.
3.2  II. Varieties of Clinical Reasoning and Values
(4) Boniolo & Campaner try to spur the debate on cau-
sation in the philosophy of biomedicine by highlight-
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ing some serious clinical aspects not yet satisfactorily 
tackled. The authors point out that some pathological 
situations addressed by molecular medicine actually 
prove resistant to (at least) some of our major epistemo-
logical accounts of causal explanation. They show the 
relevance of this problem not only for the philosophy 
of causation in the field of medicine, but for the real 
ethical issues involved and concerning the existential 
decisions that patients with severe molecular diseases 
have to take.
(5) Stanley describes the patterns of reasoning that experi-
enced clinicians use under different diagnostic circum-
stances and shows how inductive, deductive and abduc-
tive reasoning are meshed together. Through a realistic 
and detailed clinical case of a 54-year-old man with 
a sudden acute chest pain, it is shown how plausible 
diagnoses are generated, and selected on the basis of a 
combination of strategies. These strategies make use of 
probabilistic reasoning, which is inherently Bayesian, 
and they mix deduction on predicted signs and symp-
toms, given a conjectured disease, to new facts unfold-
ing from continuing clinical examination.
(6) Chiffi & Pietarinen point out that clinical equipoise 
(CE) has been proposed as an ethical principle relat-
ing uncertainty and moral leeway in clinical research. 
CE is usually indicated as a necessary condition for a 
morally justified introduction of a new RCT. However, 
questions related to the interpretation of this principle 
remain woefully open. Recent proposals to rehabili-
tate CE have divided the bioethical community on its 
ethical merits. In the light of this, Chiffi & Pietarinen 
present a new argument, based on the methodology of 
hypothetical retrospection, that brings out the episte-
mological difficulties we encounter in justifying CE as 
a principle connecting uncertainty and moral leeway in 
the ethics of clinical research.
(7) Fillion begins his analysis by considering that in spe-
cific circumstances biostatisticians think that adaptive 
design is the only ethically permissible experimental 
design. However, some proponents of CE argue that 
adaptive trials are neither ethically required nor permis-
sible. More specifically, they affirm that adaptive trials 
fail to meet the moral requirement of CE, since they 
presuppose an epistemic state that is not coherent with 
a physician’s duty of care. Fillion emphasizes that the 
debate on adaptive design and equipoise conflates two 
different conceptions of statistical evidence (namely, 
frequentist and Bayesian). Such distinction helps the 
author to propose an epistemological framework in 
which adaptive trials are both consistent with and rec-
ommended by the principle of CE.
3.3  III. Bayesian Approach
(8) Berchialla, Gregori, and Baldi explain the key role 
played by the randomization in clinical trials designs. 
While randomization is primarily intended to pre-
vent the source of bias in treatment allocation, in the 
frequentist analysis it provides a justification for the 
validity of statistical testing. Instead, in the Bayesian 
framework, the role of randomization is more nuanced, 
and the Bayesian analysis can afford a valid rationale 
for selective controls. In clinical trials, there have been 
many heated debates on the ethics of randomization 
since it has been claimed that it is ethical to randomize 
patients to different health-related interventions only in 
a state of true equipoise. In this paper the authors offer 
a view of randomization from the perspective of both 
frequentist and Bayesian inference and discuss adap-
tive randomization as point of encounter for an ethical 
evaluation of clinical trials.
(9) Andreoletti & Oldofredi make explicit an epistemo-
logical tension between the conduct of clinical trials 
and their interpretation: the reasoning underlying the 
methodological design of clinical trials hinges on a 
frequentist interpretation of probability, whereas the 
interpretation of their results often implies a Bayesian 
reasoning. The authors suggest that acknowledging the 
potentiality of Bayesianism might contribute to clarify 
and improve comprehension of medical research. They 
present a formal method which has been developed in 
the context of objective Bayesian statistics to define 
priors which have a minimal or null impact on poste-
rior probabilities. Finally, the authors show how this 
method does not violate the senses of scientific objec-
tivity which traditionally pose challenges to the Bayes-
ian perspective.
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